The Ultimate Guide to Cultural Marxist Genocide, part 3

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cultural marxism, genocide, realism

Part 3: Cooperative Conventions

In part 2 we discussed the role of copying or reproduction in the persistence of cultural and ethnic groups. The second force in the biological examples discussed in part 1 was the need for homeostatic compatibilities between the members. There is an analogous compatibility between members of an ethnic or cultural group. To see this we need to introduce Millikan’s notion of a cooperative or stabilizing function.

Imagine a case where two individuals have a common interest, the achievement of which has historically been achieved by each party reproducing their part in a pattern. The benefit of obtaining this common interest serves to coordinate each one to the other in order to cooperate in the achievement of this common purpose. For example, in order to communicate concerning the presence or actions of, say, dogs, we create and spread a convention to use the sound associated with “dog” to be reproduced on relevant occasions as to facilitate this communication. If one has an interest in alerting another individual to the presence of a dog the speaker will use this conventional sound to indicate this. There is no reason that it had to be the sound associated with “dog,” other sounds could have served just as well, as they do in other languages, but a convention was started by English speakers and the benefits of having everyone on the same page resulted in this convention being copied from person to person via learning because of its beneficial effect.

The common interest of this cooperative function is being able to communicate concerning dogs. This is normally done by the speaker doing his part of using the language conventions to communicate information, and the hearer doing their part of coming to believe that what is said is true. If speakers were too often wrong and the hearers were frequently mislead they would soon stop forming the beliefs based on the speaker’s utterances, and if hearers stopped forming the beliefs, speakers would stop using the conventions to instill these beliefs in their hearers; the convention would go extinct and speakers would try to find another way to communicate. But because both speakers and hearers interests are mutually reinforced sufficiently often there is no incentive to change the convention; it reinforces both parties in continuing to use it as precedent has determined since both sides have their interests met in doing so.  Because of this the convention will persist through time.

To take another example of Millikan’s, drivers have a common interest in avoiding collisions, so in the United States a convention was instituted so that everyone drives on the right. We cooperate with one another in the avoidance of collisions by adhering to this convention (Language: A Biological Model, p. 12). A driver approaching from the north has an interest in not colliding with a driver approaching from the south, and vice versa, and so each will be reinforced in following the convention. There is nothing inherently superior to this convention; in England the convention is driving on the left. Because of its ability to achieve the common interest in avoiding collisions this convention has been maintained in the cultural community. Thus the members of a cultural group are co-adapted to one another through learning the local conventions. They have come to adopt these behaviors as a means of enjoying the benefits successful performance of the cooperative conventions bestows–avoiding collisions–being able to converse concerning a myriad of subjects, being able to exchange goods, and so on.

An additional interesting case is the way that people coordinate their appearance. In any workplace, or neighborhood, or culture (or subculture) you are inevitably going to find a high degree of coordination of appearance. Why people coordinate in this way is very interesting, and it appears to be a cultural universal that people do so coordinate–different cultures have their conventional attire. I am sitting in an airport as I write this and the level or coordination of attire of the people around me is astounding. Everyone is wearing the standard American shoes, pants, shirt, etc.. Of course there is much variety, but the standardization is far more prevalent: there are no samurai warriors, Dutch wooden shoes, Native-American head-dresses, or the like. Attire in a sense forms its own language as people choose certain attire because of what it “says” about them. We are all in on this language just as much as we are all in on the coordinations involved in speaking English. We know that dressing certain ways will say or communicate certain things about us. If someone wore a tuxedo to a football game because they were not aware of the convention it would be an awkward and alienating experience as they became aware of the mis-coordination. Likewise, someone wearing attire of the language from one historical tradition among those of another tradition is going to produce a failure to communicate. The controversy over the Muslim headscarf is such an example. In its language the headscarf means modesty, but being produced in Western cultures it produces alienation among both wearer and perceiver as it indicates that one is not historically related to it in the way intended, and the failure to coordinate in its meaning occurs. Muslims are co-adapted to one another to understand the meaning of the headscarf and what it describes and proscribes.

In order for an individual to secure the benefits coordination bestows they must maneuver themselves into conditions that allow the cooperative function to succeed.   Take as an example the biological conditions for the successful visual perception of color. If one is in biologically abnormal conditions for successful color perception, say, it is too dark, or there are colored lights instead of sunlight, and one is unable to judge accurately an object’s color, the solution is to bring the object into functionally enabling conditions, to bring it outdoors, for example, and look at it under the sun. Millikan writes “One knows how, physically, to maneuver oneself into conditions normal for making accurate perceptual judgments of a given kind” (On Clear and Confused Ideas, p. 103). When trying to see something, we bring objects into conditions that enable successful visual perception, when trying to hear a sound we might turn our head in order to sense from which direction the sound is coming, or move closer to the sound, and so on.

The same need to bring about functionally enabling conditions exists in the case of the interpersonal cooperative functions we have been discussing; people need to bring about conditions that ensure success for the functions of language, appearance, customs, morals, and other cooperative functions. For instance, if one is in a foreign country and needs to ask a question, the answer is to maneuver yourself into success-enabling conditions, to find your co-adapted partner–another English speaker–and thus succeed in the performance of one’s cooperative function of eliciting true information from one’s listeners. Another example of maneuvering into historically enabling conditions would be the case of an immigrant who moves to an ethnic enclave in order to ensure the presence of those with whom they are co-adopted and so may succeed in various interactions. We require our co-adapted partners in order to succeed in communicating and other day-to-day interactions that require coordination and cooperation amongst members of a community in the successful performance of cooperative functions, or to avoid the negative consequences of a failure to coordinate.

Similar to how the stability of biological species results from the maintenance of compatibilities in the gene pool, the need for successful inter-personal coordination is what keeps words meaning the same things over time, or keeps traditions alive, or keeps social practices in existence. In the case of coordinating behaviors, the need for a co-adapted partner reinforces the parties in behaving in conventional ways. In the United States, drivers coordinate by driving on the right hand side of the road, people shake hands when greeting rather than, say, bowing to one another, we start work at 9 a.m., we have standards for dress, we use dollars for currency, etc. These and innumerable other historical co-adaptations are what create, constitutes, and maintains a culture; they are the bonds that hold a culture together. And just as in the biological case homeostasis preserves the diversity of biological species, this process of cultural homeostasis is what preserves cultures and ethnicities; it keeps such groups in existence over time and safe from dispersal. The members of an ethnic and cultural group are co-adapted and require one another in order to perpetuate the cultural and ethnic conventions and traditions.

We will discuss a third force in part 4.

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The Ultimate Guide to Cultural Marxist Genocide, part 2

Tags

cultural marxism, dark enlightenment, Genicide, Millikan

Part 2: Ethnic Realism

As we saw in part 1, the members of an historical kind are alike because there have been natural forces at work producing similarities among the members. These forces are real, natural forces, and not socially constructed. Now, as applies to ethnic and cultural groups, Millikan writes: “Many kinds of interest to social scientists, such as ethnic, social, economic, and vocational groups are historical kinds” (On Clear and Confused Ideas, p 22). In saying that ethnic groups are historical kinds Millikan is pointing to forces similar to those in the biological example that are at work in producing similarities between the members of ethnic groups. The social sciences that study these kinds can persist in doing empirical research on these groups that result in justified yet fallible inductions concerning them because these real natural forces promote the possession of commonalities between members. If there were no such real forces there would be no possibility of the social sciences since there would be no forces promoting likeness among members resulting in social groups.

“If social groups were not real, there could be no gain in empirical studies concerning them, for example, studies of the attitudes of American doctors toward herbal medicines, and so forth. Doctors are an actual-world group, not a set of possible properties in a set of possible worlds. That is why their attitudes and practices can be studied empirically” (On Clear and Confused Ideas, p 22).

Just as a biological species is kept relatively stable across time by natural forces, there are similar forces are at work in keeping together the cultural, ethnic, civic, vocational, and social groups studied by social sciences. Although not genetically inherited, cultural and religious traits are copied between generations through traditions and education. Similar to the way genes are copied across generations, these behaviors and ideas (memes) are copied into new generations and will promote historical continuity. That the copying is facilitated by the electro-chemical human nervous system doesn’t affect the reality of the copying process or make it less real.

“Many kinds of interest to social scientists, such as ethnic, social, economic, and vocational groups are historical kinds. For example, school teachers, doctors, and fathers form historical kinds when these groups are studied as limited to particular historical cultural contexts. Members of these groups are likely to act similarly in certain ways and to have attitudes in common as a result of similar training handed down from person to person (reproduction or copying), as a result of custom (more copying), as a result either of natural human dispositions or social pressures to conform to role models (copying again) and/or as a result of legal practices” (On Clear and Confused Ideas, page 22).

Ethnic groups copy the form of annual celebrations with each iteration, and new members come to learn the traditional form so that they may then go on to perform it themselves and pass it on. Think of the tradition of putting up a Christmas tree which is repeated each year. There are certain recurring forms that are repeated each year when someone puts up a Christmas tree so that you pretty much know what to expect when you are going to see one. True, it is possible to violate the conventions in many ways, and styles evolve over time, but the reason the violations are surprising is that you know what to expect because of the replication of the conventions. Likewise, language conventions are passed on as new members come to learn the language. And traditional styles of dress are copied as new tokens of the style are manufactured. The reproduction of distinctive styles of architecture, artifacts, rites, musical styles, and ceremonies are further examples of ethnic and cultural practices that are copied among members.

I will discuss the second factor that contributes to the persistence of a genocide-susceptible kind in part 3.

If you want to skip straight to the nature of genocide go to part 6.

The Ultimate Guide to Cultural Marxist Genocide, part 1

Tags

cultural marxism, ethnicity, genocide, realism

This is the first post in a 7-part series about the nature of genocide.  There is a condensed version of the series summarizing it’s argument here.  But please read this longer version to understand the argument in full.

My goal in this series of posts is to show why ethnic groups are real and not socially constructed, and then to explain how the reality of ethnic groups affects our understanding of genocide. The UN Convention on Genocide lists national, racial, ethnic, and religious groups as genocide-susceptible kinds. I will here be concentrating on ethnicity but the argument should hold true for the other genocide-susceptible kinds (except for national groups, which are a class, not a kind (see here for details)).

1. Historical Kinds and Realism

The first question is to ask what it means to say that a group like an ethnic, religious, or racial group is real.  In this part I am just going to repeat the realist ontology I presented in my series on race; the later posts in the series will spell out how this applies to ethnic and other genocide-susceptible kinds. The premier realist philosopher today is Ruth Millikan. As Crawford Elder says, “Millikan does give a realist account of kind-sameness… Indeed she gives the only extant account that truly deserves to be called “realist”” (Millikan and Her Critics, p. 155). Millikan begins her realist account of ontology by defining what she calls, after Aristotle, a substance. Millikan’s substances are those things about which you can learn from one encounter something of what to expect on other encounters, where this is no accident but the result of a real connection (On Clear and Confused Ideas, p. 15). What she means by a real connection is that there have been natural forces at work producing similarities between individuals. Think of the cars rolling off a production line. They are alike in numerous ways because there are forces at work producing similarities in shape, mass, behavior, and so on. For instance, they are all modeled on the same blueprint, and produced by the same mechanical forces. Because of this, if you learn something about a 2014 Honda Civic, you know what to expect when encountering another one on another occasion. There were natural causal forces at work producing these similarities between individuals, and we can exploit these lines of causation in our predictive powers in order to use information gained by one encounter with a member of a kind for use when encountering other members.

Millikan says that there are three types of substances: individuals, ahistorical kinds, and historical kinds. Individuals are just that: individual items like this chair, Bob, my house, Fido the dog, and so on. If you know that Bob is six feet tall with brown eyes and black hair, likes Mexican food, and votes Democratic, you can exploit this information to figure that Bob will be 6 feet tall with brown eyes and black hair, likes Mexican food, and votes Democratic on the next occasion you meet him. Of course this knowledge is not infallible, but the world is stable enough for us to benefit from exploiting causal regularities in guiding our expectations.

Ahistorical kinds are thing like atoms, molecules, planets and so on. Members of these kinds share properties because they share an inner structure. Because water is H2O you can reliably predict how water will behave on various occasions: that it will freeze at 0 degrees Celsius, that heavy things will sink when put in it, that it will quench thirst, and so on.

The final kind of substance is historical kinds. As the name implies, individuals are members of historical kinds due to certain recurring historical causative factors that explain their commonalities and allow the kind to persist through time. Millikan gives three such causative factors. The first of these forces is that individual members of an historical kind possess shared features due to a copying or replication process. For example, a paradigmatic example of an historical kind is a biological species. Whereas Aristotle believed that the members of each species shared an ahistorical eternal form or essence that constituted the essential characteristics of the various species and kept them constant through time, modern biology, in contrast, does not believe there is any such essence to species, not even on the genetic level, i.e., some gene or group of such “cow genes” that all and only cows have. Instead, what keeps the characteristics of species relatively stable over time is, first of all, that the genes that make cows are copied from one another. This genetic copying process that occurs in sexual reproduction ensures a similarity between generations (On Clear and Confused Ideas, p 20).

The second factor given by Millikan is the need for compatibilities between the members of a kind. In the case of biological species, the genes in the gene pool of a species must remain sufficiently compatible with one another so that when they are combined in sexual reproduction they can produce offspring that have a decent chance of viability and survival (Eldredge and Gould (1972: 114), cited in Millikan (2000: 19)). If the diversity of genes became so great that the chromosomes of a mating pair were no longer sufficiently compatible, viable offspring would not result. Thus a degree of similarity between members of a species is guaranteed as any drastically different character is unlikely to prove viable and will be weeded out of the gene pool. These factors will retard genetic drift and will contribute to the stability of the species over time.

The third and final causal factor given by Millikan for the stability of a species over time is the stability of the environment itself which will see to it through natural selection that mutations that do not provide a benefit to the individual will not get passed on. Significant mutations that an individual may possess will likely be detrimental to the organism in that environment, and those that deviate from the well-adapted form will likely be weeded out. Thus the stability of environmental conditions will contribute to the stability of the species over time.

These kinds are real because the forces producing similarities are real, natural forces. What makes something a 2014 Honda Civic is not socially constructed in that an individual’s belonging to this kind is not a matter of the classification scheme in use; it is an objective fact whether an item has properties in common with other individuals as a result of being produced by common historical forces.

I will show how this applies to ethnic groups in part 2.